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THE EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE: We can't directly observe bidder valuations, so we combine auction theory with data on outcomes (no sale/noncompetitive sale/competitive auction) to structurally estimate bidder behavior using data on BLM auctions, then simulate different auction formats.
11mo
🧵 NEW RESEARCH with Eric Lewis and @dioenescfg.bsky.social! What happens when #auction sellers can't credibly #commit to their reserve prices? Our new paper examines this classic question in the context of federal #BLM auctions of #oil & #gas #leases. PAPER: dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn...
11mo
THE BIG INSIGHT: Secondary noncompetitive sales undermine reserve prices as a revenue tool BUT the net effect depends heavily on post-sale revenues (royalties, rentals). These only occur if leases are actually sold, and generate most revenues - not the initial sale