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Mark Agerton
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🎓 Excited to share our 2025-26 job market candidates from UC Davis Agricultural & Resource Economics! Please consider them for your open positions! are.ucdavis.edu/phd/job-cand... #EconJobMarket #Economics #PhD @wenjie-zhan.bsky.social @thjchen.bsky.social @rachelejones.bsky.social
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: effects are complex and depend on gov't objectives. Revenue goals points one way, but there are other considerations: #environmental protection, #energysecurity, recreational access, etc. Small #auction design changes can have large, counterintuitive effects.
THE BIG INSIGHT: Secondary noncompetitive sales undermine reserve prices as a revenue tool BUT the net effect depends heavily on post-sale revenues (royalties, rentals). These only occur if leases are actually sold, and generate most revenues - not the initial sale
OUR FINDINGS (TABLE 7): Montana/Dakotas: Eliminating noncompetitive leasing would: • ✅ Increase auction revenue: $3.1M → $3.2M (+$97K), • ❌ Decrease rental revenue: $4.1M → $3.7M (-$346K), • ❌ Decrease royalties: $792M → $773M (-$19.2M), • 📉 NET EFFECT: -$19.4M