In my Beliefs Experiment, I prompt Advisors to guess the Chooser’s strategy before sending their recommendations. I find that Advisors become much more likely to send optimal recommendations. [6/7]
Thanks so much for sharing this profile of my work, @econuoft.bsky.social! It was a pleasure chatting about my research, teaching and involvement in the academic community.
To study whether paternalistic “Advisors” can persuade reluctant “Choosers” to change their behavior, I:
1️⃣Develop a model of a recommendation game, which characterizes the recommendations an Advisor *should* send.
2️⃣Experimentally test whether Advisors *actually* send them. [2/7]
#EconSky #EconJMP
A Chooser should reject a recommendation to switch to sprinkler 3. Thus, an Advisor’s optimal recommendations involve recommending sprinkler 2 when pot 3 is the plant pot. Intuitively, this prompts the Chooser to make a small welfare-improving change, instead of none at all! [4/7]
My results imply that...
- Advisors may not consider how Choosers will respond to their recommendations
- Prompting them to do so may improve their ability to steer Choosers towards better decisions
Read more here: alexballyk.github.io/personal-web...
Thanks! Feedback is welcome!🙂 [7/7]
