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Thanks so much for sharing this profile of my work, @econuoft.bsky.social! It was a pleasure chatting about my research, teaching and involvement in the academic community.
In my Beliefs Experiment, I prompt Advisors to guess the Chooser’s strategy before sending their recommendations. I find that Advisors become much more likely to send optimal recommendations. [6/7]
In the experiments, I frame the game as follows: - One "plant pot" contains a seed that will grow more if a sprinkler closer to it is turned on - A Chooser decides whether to accept a recommendation to switch sprinklers, but is wary of the recommendation to switch to sprinkler 3 [3/7]
To study whether paternalistic “Advisors” can persuade reluctant “Choosers” to change their behavior, I: 1️⃣Develop a model of a recommendation game, which characterizes the recommendations an Advisor *should* send. 2️⃣Experimentally test whether Advisors *actually* send them. [2/7]
Hi! Could I please be added? :)