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Law professors blogging since 2002 -- independent until 2014, hosted at Washington Post 2014-17, hosted at Reason 2017-now
Volokh Conspiracy









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What’s on your mind?
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread
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I think the Court is hoping these cases go away on the merits and they won't have to deal with them.
[Josh Blackman] Why is the Court GVRing Cases In Light Of Callais That Did Not Turn On The Issues In Callais?
The district court had departed downward from the Sentencing Guidelines' recommended sentence of 30 to 50 years.
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[Eugene Volokh] 8½-Year Sentence for American Who Fought for ISIS Is Too Lenient, Says Sixth Circuit
5/17/1954: Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe are decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: May 17, 1954 appeared first on Reason.com.
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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: May 17, 1954
But reputational and professional harm is generally not a basis for allowing pseudonymity in most cases (since so many litigants face some such harm from the allegations in their cases being public). Did it make sense to allow it here?
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5/18/1860: Abraham Lincoln wins the Republican Party presidential nomination. President Abraham Lincoln The post Today in Supreme Court History: May 18, 1860 appeared first on Reason.com.
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[Eugene Volokh] Plaintiff Can Sue Pseudonymously Because She's a Criminal Defense Lawyer with a Gambling Addiction
[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: May 18, 1860
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From Wikipedia, photo by Dmitry Rozhkov of display "Rock on bones" in Gallery "Vinzavod", Moscow (2008) My father Vladimir was remarking yesterday about an item from his youth in the USSR: People wanted to hear Western music (such as jazz and rock), but the Soviet authorities wouldn't allow it to be distributed. One could sometimes hear it on foreign shortwave broadcasts, but how to record it? And if one could get a smuggled foreign LP, how to duplicate it? Consumer tape recorders were generally unavailable. People had record players, and some people managed to cobble together recording machines for LPs. But the standard recording medium—vinyl—wasn't available to ordinary consumers. So people would record instead on used X-rays, such as the ones you can see above. The story made its way into the West some time ago; there's a recent book on the subject, Bone Music: Soviet X-Ray Audio, and an accompanying web site. Here's an excerpt from the site: The bootleggers' first technical problem, that of obtaining a machine to record with was relatively straightforward. Literature existed explaining audio recording techniques (say in case a righteous citizen wanted to copy the speeches of Comrade Stalin) and various recording machines had been brought back from Germany as trophies after the second world war. These could be adapted or copied, but a further problem existed. The State completely controlled the means of manufacturing records. You couldn't just go and buy the vinyl or shellac or lacquer needed in a store somewhere. But at some point, some enterprising music lover hit on a genius idea. An alternative source of raw materials was available - used X-ray plates obtained from local hospitals. And that is where this story really begins. For many older people in Russia remember seeing and hearing strange vinyl type discs when they were young. The discs had partial images of skeletons on them and were called 'Bones' or 'Ribs' and they contained wonderful music, music that was forbidden. The practice of copying and recording music onto X-rays really got going in St Petersburg, a port where it was … easier to obtain illicit records from abroad. But it spread, first to Moscow and then to most major conurbations throughout the states of the Soviet Union. The term "Roentgenizdat" is of course cognate to "samizdat." "Samizdat" was a combination of "self-" ("sam") and the first two syllables of "publishing house" ("izdatel'stvo"). The "sam" was replaced by "Рентген," often anglicized as "Roentgen," which is the root for all things X-ray in Russian (after the discoverer of X-rays, Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen). The post Memories of a Different Planet: Roentgenizdat appeared first on Reason.com.
From today's Second Circuit decision in Christian v. Keane, in an opinion by Judge Joseph Bianco, joined by Judge Eunice Lee and, as to the Private Proverty Provision, Judge Steven Menashi: These two appeals involve Plaintiffs' Second Amendment challenge to New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act ("CCIA") provisions prohibiting firearm possession in two types of locations: (1) private property "where [a] person knows or reasonably should know that the owner or lessee of such property has not permitted such possession by clear and conspicuous signage indicating that the carrying of [guns] on their property is permitted or by otherwise giving express consent; and (2) "sensitive locations. Plaintiffs challenge the Private Property Provision, as applied to private property open to the public. Plaintiffs asserted only a facial challenge to the Public Parks Provision in the district court, but now also seek to raise an as-applied challenge based upon its application to rural parks. We conclude that the Private Property Provision, as applied to private property open to the public, is unconstitutional because the State did not carry its burden of demonstrating that the restriction falls within our Nation's historical tradition of gun regulations, as required under the framework set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022). On the other hand, we conclude that the Public Parks Provision survives Plaintiffs' facial challenge because the State has carried its burden of showing that regulation is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of banning gun possession in urban public parks. Finally, we decline to address any as-applied challenge to the Public Parks Provision, to the extent it applies to rural parks, because Plaintiffs failed to raise that challenge in the district court. Judge Menashi dissented in part as to the Public Parks Provision. The post The Second Amendment, Guns on Private Property, Guns in Parks, and "The Fifth Element" appeared first on Reason.com.
[Eugene Volokh] Memories of a Different Planet: Roentgenizdat
[Eugene Volokh] The Second Amendment, Guns on Private Property, Guns in Parks, and "The Fifth Element"
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[Eugene Volokh] Court Refuses to Order Pam Bondi to Delete Tweeted Booking Photos in Prosecution for Interference with ICE in Minneapolis
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From Magistrate Judge Elsa Bullard (D. Minn.) Wednesday in U.S. v. Doyle: On January 26, 2026, the Government filed a complaint alleging that Defendant Joshua Doyle "did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, or interfere with … Victim 1, a United State[s] Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent" performing official duties, and made physical contact with the victim, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)…. Mr. Doyle moves for a "gag order" based on two posts that he alleges former Attorney General Pam Bondi made "regarding Mr. Doyle" prior to his initial appearance. Mr. Doyle asks me to "prohibit[ ] the Government from making further statements about [him]" and to direct Bondi to remove the two posts. On January 28, former Attorney General Pam Bondi allegedly made two posts on the social-media platform, X. In the first post, made at 12:53 pm., she stated: I am on the ground in Minneapolis today. Federal agents have arrested 16 Minnesota rioters for allegedly assaulting federal law enforcement—people who have been resisting and impeding our federal law enforcement agents. We expect more arrests to come. I've said it before and I'll say it again: NOTHING will stop President Trump and this Department of Justice from enforcing the law." In the second post, made at 1:10 p.m., Mr. Doyle alleges that Bondi posted a "'booking' style photo" of him…. Mr. Doyle's briefing suggests three separate grounds for a gag order. First, he suggests that a gag order should issue based on his compelling privacy interest in the booking photos. He relies on a civil, Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") case, Detroit Free Press Inc. v. United States Department of Justice (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc). There, a newspaper asked the Government to disclose booking photos of defendants in an active criminal prosecution. When the Government denied its request, the newspaper sued, arguing that FOIA required disclosure. The Government argued that nondisclosure of the booking photos was permissible under FOIA's Exemption 7(C). The court's extensive Exemption 7(C) analysis considered whether the defendants had a privacy interest in the photos and, if so, whether the privacy interest outweighed "the core purpose of the FOIA, which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government." The court agreed with the Government that defendants generally have "a non-trivial privacy interest" in booking photos. It remanded to the district court to assess whether public interest in understanding government operations or activities under FOIA outweighed the defendants' privacy interests in that particular case. Mr. Doyle plucks from Detroit Free Press's lengthy analysis the holding that defendants have a privacy interest in booking photos; he notes that this is consistent with policy and regulations recognizing that booking photos are sensitive information. But as Mr. Doyle seems to acknowledge, a privacy interest alone doesn't authorize me to issue a gag order. Indeed, even Detroit Free Press indicates that booking photos may be disclosed under some circumstances. Mr. Doyle certainly has some privacy interest in his booking photo. But the parties do not provide fulsome discussion of Mr. Doyle's privacy interest weighed against the Government's interests. I therefore reject any suggestion that I can restrain the Government from publicizing the booking photo based solely on Mr. Doyle's privacy interest in it. Second, Mr. Doyle argues that a gag order should issue because Bondi's X posts violate his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial, undermining the presumption of innocence and "creat[ing] an unacceptable risk of prejudice" by tainting "'the minds of the jurors at trial.'" He claims that Bondi deleting her posts would "minimize[ ] the ongoing damage that the Government has already done." Mr. Doyle relies on Beck v. Washington (1962), which concerned a high-profile criminal case that received significant, lengthy pre-trial publicity. During jury selection, venire "members were examined by the court and counsel at length." Those admitting bias or "preformed opinion" were excused. The defendant used all his peremptory challenges. The Court's "study of the voir dire indicate[d] clearly that each juror's qualifications as to the impartiality far exceeded the minimum standards this Court established in its earlier cases." Thus, the Court could "[ ]not say the pretrial publicity was so intensive and extensive or the examination of the entire panel revealed such prejudice that the court could not believe the answers of the jurors and would be compelled to find bias or preformed opinion as a matter of law." Beck concluded: "While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality." It held that the defendant there hadn't met this burden. Beck thus teaches that even with significant pre-trial publicity, a robust jury-selection process can safeguard against essential unfairness. Here, the two X posts are far less intensive and extensive than the prolonged media campaign in Beck. Rigorous jury selection can safeguard against any potential prejudice caused. Therefore, I find that Mr. Doyle has not met his burden under Beck to demonstrate the "reality" that Bondi's publication of the two X posts will cause essential unfairness at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Third, Mr. Doyle suggests that a gag order should issue because former Attorney General Bondi was a legal representative in this case when she made the posts. Mr. Doyle acknowledges that prior restraints on speech are strongly disfavored as a serious infringement on the First Amendment rights of the public and the press. But he relies on Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, (1991), to argue that these concerns are lessened when the speech being constrained is that of the case's lawyers. In Gentile, the Court considered a challenge to a Nevada Supreme Court rule prohibiting an attorney from commenting about a case to the media if the attorney knew or should have known the comments would "have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." The Court's earlier opinions "expressly contemplated that the speech of those participating before the courts could be limited," indicating that "a less demanding standard than [the clear-and-present danger standard] established for regulation of the press" applied to legal representatives. Gentile therefore held that the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard was constitutionally sufficient to justify proscribing an attorney's extrajudicial comments under the state rule. Here, neither party addresses the fact that Bondi is no longer a lawyer in this case [since she was dismissed as AG on April 2] or what impact her now-non-legal-representative status has on the applicable standard. But even under Gentile's relaxed standard for lawyers, I find that Mr. Doyle has not met his burden. Bondi's two posts do not amount to a prolonged, overly divulgent, inflammatory mainstream media campaign against Mr. Doyle. And if Bondi's posts were reposted by others (a point Mr. Doyle doesn't address), ordering her to delete her original posts wouldn't resolve the problem of potential prejudice. Thus, Mr. Doyle has not shown that prejudice is substantially likely or that the requested remedy could alleviate any likely prejudice. As discussed, jury selection is the best guard against this risk. The post Court Refuses to Order Pam Bondi to Delete Tweeted Booking Photos in Prosecution for Interference with ICE in Minneapolis appeared first on Reason.com.
So Special Judge Steven David (Ind. Super. Ct. St. Joseph County) ruled Friday. There had been a dispute about the reasonableness of the attorney fees, as there often is, but the court largely ruled that defendant's fee request was indeed reasonable (with only modest deductions). It also noted that the plaintiff didn't use the opportunity to present live evidence at the fee hearing, which might have offered more of a chance at successfully challenging the fees: No questions were asked of [defendant's] Lead Counsel. No one asked him to be placed under oath to give additional testimony other than his previous declarations. He was not asked to justify the hours. He was not asked any questions at all that may have helped the trial court judge determine what was reasonable or unreasonable. Such an examination would seem to this trial judge as to have been very helpful to it in its determination of what is reasonable and what is not. For more on the substance of the case, here's an excerpt from the opinion in Kay v. Irish Rover Inc., decided last year by Indiana Court of Appeals Judge Paul Mathias, joined by Judges Elaine Brown and Dana Kenworthy: Dr. Tamara Kay appeals the St. Joseph Superior Court's order granting The Irish Rover, Inc.'s, motion to dismiss her defamation claim…. On the dates the alleged defamation occurred, Dr. Kay was a tenured professor in the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Sociology Department at the University of Notre Dame. Her "academic research and teaching is focused on trade, labor, social movements, globalization, organizations, and global health which includes reproductive health and rights." Many of Dr. Kay's extensive writings in journals, newspapers, and on Twitter focus on advocating for abortion legalization. The Irish Rover is an independent, student newspaper at the University. {[O]ne of its missions is to articulate and defend the Catholic character of the University.} … After the United States Supreme Court decided Dobbs v. Jackson Woman's Health Organization on June 24, 2022, Dr. Kay "became more outspoken on the issue of abortion access," including more frequent posts on Twitter. On September 15, 2022, the Indiana General Assembly's legislation limiting abortion in Indiana took effect, although it was enjoined shortly thereafter…. Kay sued over two articles published by the Irish Rover that concerned Dr. Kay's speech. To oversimplify matters somewhat, under Indiana libel law, a libel claim based on speech on matters of public concern can only prevail based on a showing of knowing or reckless falsehood—mere negligence isn't enough, even if plaintiff is a private figure. (In this respect, Indiana libel law is more speaker-protective than the constitutional minimum set forth by First Amendment law.) And here, the court concluded that the Rover's statements were either true or at least reasonable interpretations of the facts that the Rover had, and certainly weren't knowingly or recklessly false: Here, we agree with the trial court that the undisputed facts established that The Irish Rover's two articles were written in good faith and that the alleged defamatory statements were not false. The October 12, 2022, article is titled "Keough School Professor Offers Abortion Access to Students." The article discusses a panel Dr. Kay participated in and her opinions on the ineffectiveness and immorality of abortion bans. The newspaper quoted Dr. Kay as stating that her "view runs afoul of Church teaching, but in other areas, [her] positions are perfectly aligned [with the Church.]" The article included a photograph of the sign on Dr. Kay's office door, which stated, "This is a SAFE SPACE to get help and information on ALL Healthcare issues and access – confidentially with care and compassion[.]" The sign also included the letter "J" in a circle, which the article recognized to "denote Notre Dame professors who are willing to help students access abortion." In support of that statement, the article cited to a social media post where Dr. Kay stated, "'[w]e are here (as private citizens, not representatives of ND) to help you access healthcare when you need it, and we are prepared in every way. Look for the 'J'[,] Spread the word to students!'" The article also discussed the legality and availability of Plan B and Plan C abortion pills. In particular, the article stated that, "in reference to these pills," Dr. Kay had tweeted, "'Will help as a private citizen if you have issues w access or cost. DM me [sic].'" The article described Dr. Kay's retweets of posts from groups concerning reimbursement of costs of obtaining an abortion out of state or getting Plan C pills by mail. The article stated that the sign on her office door was later removed and her tweets referencing abortions for students were later deleted. The article reported that, during the panel event, Dr. Kay was asked if her statements promoting abortion were aligned with "Church teaching and Notre Dame policy," and Dr. Kay responded that she was not actively promoting abortion, but then later clarified, "[o]h, I am doing that as a private citizen …." {In her complaint, Dr. Kay did not specifically allege that any of the statements in the October article were untrue or defamatory…. As most of the article contains quotes from Dr. Kay's social media or the sign on her office door, she could not reasonably question the veracity of the statements in the article. It appears that her claim of defamation regarding the October article is based solely on the title of the article.} The Irish Rover published its second article on March 22, 2023, which was titled, "Tamara Kay Explains Herself to Notre Dame Democrats." The College Democrats had invited Dr. Kay to speak about her career and research and how her work has impacted "'her activism around abortion rights post-Dobbs[.]'" In her complaint, Dr. Kay challenged the following specific statements from the article as false and defamatory: 1) that Dr. Kay was "posting offers to procure abortion pills on her office door"; 2) that Dr. Kay said to the audience, "if you have that academic freedom, you should use it"; and 3) that Dr. Kay acknowledged that the students in the crowd could not be as forward in their pro-abortion activities as she is and stated, "I can't impose that on you … but I'm doing me, and you should do you." {During the panel discussion [before the College Democrats], an audience member asked Dr. Kay how students should have conversations about abortion "during this time" and referenced the University's statement that the students have academic freedom. Dr. Kay responded, "you have to really be fully committed to activism to be able to stick your neck out like I am right? [B]ecause I can't impose that or say you should do it. You know, you have to do what you have to do. And I think what I've come to is I'm doing me, and other folks can do them." Dr. Kay also stated, "if you don't have academic freedom, you don't have a university. You can't call it a university."} The article also included Dr. Kay's faculty photo, which she did not give the paper permission to use. [The court doesn't analyze this photograph point separately, but generally a photographed person doesn't need to give permission for a newspaper to use the photograph; and any copyright claim would have had to be asserted in federal court by the copyright owner, which was likely the University rather than the professor. -EV] The Irish Rover's statements in their articles concerning Dr. Kay were quotes from Dr. Kay's social media, statements paraphrasing Dr. Kay's statements at the panel event, or statements discussing Dr. Kay's prior publications. Included in its designated evidence, The Irish Rover submitted copies of the tweets referenced or quoted in the October article and a transcript from the March panel event. The newspaper also submitted articles published in 2022 and 2023 by (or co-authored by) Dr. Kay addressing access to abortion, and the burdens and negative effects of abortion bans. Dr. Kay never explicitly stated that she would assist a student by procuring abortion pills for that student. But The Irish Rover made a reasonable inference from Dr. Kay's own statements that she would do so. It was reasonable for The Irish Rover reporters to conclude that assistance or help would include providing information to a student on how abortion medication could be obtained…. [T]he articles were not fabricated and were not based on unverified anonymous sources or sources wholly lacking in credibility. Therefore, The Irish Rover presented a prima facie case that the articles had a "reasonable basis in fact." Dr. Kay was therefore required to designate evidence to establish that the statements lacked a "reasonable basis in fact." In response to The Irish Rover's motion to dismiss, Dr. Kay designated her own affidavit and described her only interaction with a student staff member of The Irish Rover. In particular, she stated that Joseph DeReuil had spoken with her after the September 2022 panel event but did not ask to interview her or disclose the fact that he was recording their conversation. Dr. Kay stated that DeReuil did not ask her about the sign on her office door, what she meant by "healthcare" or what the "J" symbolized. Dr. Kay averred that the "J" stood for "'Jane Doe,' which is how victims of sexual assault are typically referred to" and that she had used the "J" to express that she is "an ally for victims of sexual assault." Dr. Kay's affidavit also quoted an email she had received from DeReuil asking for a meeting to continue their discussion about Dr. Kay's abortion position and an email received within hours of DeReuil's email from a Holy Cross student asking for Dr. Kay's assistance in procuring Plan C. Dr. Kay did not respond to either email because she assumed that "the close proximity in time" of receipt "was not a coincidence …." Dr. Kay averred that the sign on her office door "pertained to student sexual assaults" and "did not pertain to abortion." And she claimed that a statement in the October article that she used the "panel as a platform to explain why she thought abortion bans are ineffective and immoral, complementing her work to bring abortion to Notre Dame students" was false and defamatory. Likewise, Dr. Kay claimed that The Irish Rover's statements that she offered help to obtain abortion medications and abortion services were false and defamatory. {However, as we noted above, Dr. Kay did not specifically claim that any of these statements were false and defamatory in her complaint.} None of Dr. Kay's public statements discussed in The Irish Rover's articles referenced her specific concerns for victims of sexual assault. She expressed those concerns in private emails between herself and other University faculty members. However, her public statements, her social media posts, and her writings concerned access to abortion services or reproductive healthcare. We therefore conclude that Dr. Kay's designated evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether The Irish Rover had a reasonable basis in fact to publish the statements in the two articles. The Irish Rover's reporters reasonably concluded that Dr. Kay was generally addressing access to abortion and assistance to students who needed information about procuring an abortion. Even if Dr. Kay would be able to prove that she intended only to assist sexual assault victims who wanted an abortion, Dr. Kay would also have to prove that The Irish Rover acted with actual malice at trial…. The Irish Rover designated evidence via deposition testimony from the authors of the articles that they believed that the inferences that they made from Dr. Kay's own statements, publications, and social media posts, which they published in the articles, were true. While it is true that DeReuil could have specifically asked Dr. Kay what the "J" on her office door stood for and what she specifically meant by her statements about helping individuals who needed access to healthcare, DeReuil's failure to do so is not evidence of actual malice, particularly in light of the undisputed fact that he asked to meet with Dr. Kay before the article was published but she did not respond to the request. {The Irish Rover designated evidence that the "J" could have been a reference to the Jane Collective, a pro-choice group that offered to assist women to obtain abortions by transporting them across state lines.} … The designated evidence thus established that The Irish Rover reporters believed that the statements in their articles were true, and, therefore, Dr. Kay would not be able to prove her claim of defamation…. For the same reasons, The Irish Rover also presented a prima facie case that its publications were made in good faith…. Jim Bopp and Taylor C. Shetina (The Bopp Law Firm, PC) represent the Irish Rover. The post Notre Dame Pro-Abortion-Rights Professor Ordered to Pay $200K in Fees in Failed Libel Lawsuit Against Student Newspaper appeared first on Reason.com.
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[Eugene Volokh] Notre Dame Pro-Abortion-Rights Professor Ordered to Pay $200K in Fees in Failed Libel Lawsuit Against Student Newspaper