No, I mean that you could say that the commissions clause is a limit on executive power, but not one that modifies removal, so it is irrelevant to how we interpret the vesting clause. I.e. the same argument UET would make to deal w/the anti-unitary appointments clause.
Well and also that Congress doesn’t seem to have gotten worked up about that assertion. Perhaps because they agreed with it…
Again, not saying this is dispositive, but it does feel relevant to the historical question.
Don’t sleep on 1887!
The question of why the presidents felt they had sweeping removal authority plus the lack of any backlash from Congress raises the question of whether there might be some agreement on removal authority. Not dispositive, but definitely some kind of evidence.
Casey is a rockstar — so glad to see this coming out!!
2. (cont.) kind of like how the appts clause splits the executive power of appt between Congress and the president.
3. How often could people possibly expect the firing of officers pre-commission delivery to come up? Outside of cases like Marbury, most commission deliverers are also appointers 2/2.
It’s been awhile since I’ve read the piece and I’d have to reread to remember my thoughts in detail, but three things occur to me
1. Unitarists often limit unitarism when it comes to ministerial duties
2. If it’s written into the constitution it might be a modification of normal presumptions 1/
Great new essay on the rise and fall of the politics-administration distinction. And a powerful entry in the “the politics of deregulation are more complicated than you think” genre!
Nathaniel Donahue
Nathaniel Donahue
Nathaniel Donahue
Nathaniel Donahue
Noah Rosenblum
Nathaniel Donahue
Nathaniel Donahue
Nathaniel Donahue
Settled, yes. But the fact that a lot of people were asserting the presidentialist removal position suggests that the idea behind UET (or rather, the removal plank) at least occurred to people at the founding.
