We find that:
Rules work: Simply having a rule reduces free-riding and increases cooperation.
Adding enforcement leads to exact rule-following and less free-riding — but also crowds out full, voluntary cooperation. (3/n)
Surprisingly, we find no evidence that biased audits erode norms, reduce cooperation, or diminish compliance. (4/n)
Institutional rules promote cooperation by strengthening personal and social norms, which in turn sustains contributions over time. In contrast, in the absence of a rule, norms are weaker and contributions decline steadily over time. (5/n)
We test this in an experiment varying the existence of a rule governing public good contributions & whether enforcement of the rule is biased against some players. (2/n)
We are thrilled to welcome Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee as the new Lemann Foundation Professors to our department, beginning in the summer of 2026.
Neues Diskussionspapier: "Asymmetric Labor Supply Responses to Tax Rate Reform: Experimental Evidence" von Katharina Pfeil, @mkasper.bsky.social, Sarah Necker und @larsfeld.bsky.social
www.eucken.de/publikatione...
