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This team was comprised of @yale.edu student Tobias Liu, @nyulaw.bsky.social @cmorten.bsky.social, and CRRIT Co-Directors @jsross119.bsky.social & @reshmagar.bsky.social (4/4) jamanetwork.com/journals/jam...
Are settlement fines enough to deter pharmaceutical manufacturers from paying illegal kickbacks to doctors? In this study, we found that pharmaceutical manufacturers paid a median of 2% of the revenue earned from the drugs they were paying kickbacks for (2/4)
Between 2000-2025, pharmaceutical manufacturers penalized for kickbacks paid only 2.2% of US revenue accrued from selling implicated drugs (1/2)
17d
17d
6d
Yale CRRIT
Yale CRRIT
Yale CRRIT
CRRIT Co-Director @reshmagar.bsky.social told @statnews.com “there’s a calculation by companies to still engage in these behaviors because the penalties don’t mean much” (2/2) 🔗 www.statnews.com/pharmalot/20...
6d
Yale CRRIT
These findings suggest that for many pharmaceutical companies, settlement fines may function as an economically tolerable cost of doing business rather than a meaningful deterrent, and that stronger enforcement tools may be necessary to deter illegal kickbacks (3/4)
We are excited to share a recently published article in @jamanetworkopen.com examining 25 years of kickback-related settlements between the U.S. government and pharmaceutical manufacturers (1/4)
17d
If FDA believes the plausible mechanism approach is appropriate, they will “move toward granting marketing authorization for the product” once a sponsor “has demonstrated success with several consecutive patients with different bespoke therapies” (3/5) www.nejm.org/doi/full/10....
17d
This team was comprised of @pennmehp.bsky.social @hollylynchez.bsky.social, CRRIT Co-Director @reshmagar.bsky.social , Washington University @rachelsachs.bsky.social, @pennmehp.bsky.social Steven Joffe, & @ohiostatelaw.bsky.social Patricia Zettler (5/5) www.healthaffairs.org/content/fore...
2mo
2mo
The pathway was announced in @nejm.org without a policy process open to public comment. Approval based on plausible mechanism can be a path to market entry when a RCT is not feasible if a sponsor “has [had] success with several consecutive patients with different bespoke therapies” (2/5)
2mo
Yale CRRIT
Yale CRRIT
Yale CRRIT
Yale CRRIT
Yale CRRIT
We are excited to share a recently published article in @jamanetworkopen.com examining 25 years of kickback-related settlements between the U.S. government and pharmaceutical manufacturers (1/4)
17d
Yale CRRIT