I argue that the word ‘speciesism’ has as its main function to designate a phenomenon analogous to racism, and thereby allow us to draw instructive parallels between this phenomenon and racism, parallels that we can then use to investigate and debate the morality of this phenomenon.
In the animal ethics literature, speciesism is defined in all sorts of manners: as a behaviour or a philosophical view, as necessarily anthropocentric or possibly centred on other species, as necessarily based on species or possibly not, as necessarily immoral or possibly ethically acceptable.
I define speciesism as unequal treatment based on species and argue that this definition fares better than extant accounts insofar as it satisfies these two conditions.
"Rédigé dans un style sans verbiage, l’ouvrage se distingue par sa clarté et la rigueur de son argumentation. Il offre une introduction incontournable au débat contemporain sur l’éthique du véganisme." Ce n'est pas moi qui le dis; c'est la quatrième de couverture.