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Dr. Malte Doehne and Prof. Dr. Katja Rost examine how favoritism in political appointments can be reduced through institutional design. Using historical data from 18th‑century Basel, the authors show that family ties strongly influenced access to political office under normal conditions. Howev...
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Dr. Malte Doehne and Prof. Dr. Katja Rost examine how favoritism in political appointments can be reduced through institutional design. Using historical data from 18th‑century Basel, the authors show that family ties strongly influenced access to political office under normal conditions. Howev...
«Qualified lotteries can neutralize conflicts of interest in the appointment of individuals to positions of power» by Malte Doehne and Katja Rost
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