Inlay

Click to expand Image A fighter loyal to the army patrols a market area in Khartoum on March 24, 2025. © 2025 Photo by AFP via Getty Images (Nairobi) – The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) should ensure that Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanders who have defected to the Sudanese army, including two since April 2026, are held to account for their role in serious crimes, Human Rights Watch said today. This includes cooperating with ongoing independent regional and international investigations into serious international crimes in Darfur and other parts of Sudan. “Those responsible for serious international crimes and human rights violations do not get a free pass if they switch sides,” said Mohamed Osman, Sudan researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Sudanese people who have experienced horrific abuses under any commander’s watch deserve justice and an end to the vicious cycles of impunity that have long haunted Sudan.” In May, Commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as Al-Savannah, a key RSF commander who took part in operations in Kordofan and Darfur, defected and joined the SAF. Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as Al-Nour Al-Qubba, who led some of the RSF forces in North Darfur, defected in April and immediately joined the SAF. Human Rights Watch documented widespread RSF attacks against civilians in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, including wanton killings and rapes, particularly during the RSF takeover of the city in late October 2025. Human Rights Watch verified videos confirming the presence of both commanders during the RSF’s 18-month siege of El Fasher. Official RSF channels have issued statements that Al-Nour Al-Qubba had a commanding role for the RSF in El Fasher as early as April 2024. The Sudanese army leader and chairperson of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, welcomed Al-Qubba into the SAF publicly. On May 17, a few days after announcing his departure from the RSF, Commander Ali Rizq Allah held a news conference wearing a SAF uniform where he denounced the RSF and vowed to fight with the SAF. Days into the outbreak of the conflict between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, al-Burhan declared a general amnesty for RSF fighters who “would lay down their arms,” saying they could be integrated into the military. He renewed the call in February 2026. Meanwhile, the SAF and allied forces have targeted civilians they accuse of “collaborating” with the RSF, including by detaining them unlawfully. The recent defections are not the first high-profile RSF defections to the SAF. In October 2024, Abu Aqla Keikel, then-commander of the Sudan Shield Forces, an armed group aligned with RSF forces in Gezira state in central Sudan at the time, defected to the SAF. Keikel, along with his armed forces, had joined the RSF in 2023, and in December 2023, the RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” appointed Keikel as an RSF commander over the newly captured Gezira state. While Keikel was in that position, RSF fighters committed killings, sexual violence, and widespread pillaging across the state. Following Keikel’s defection to the SAF, Human Rights Watch documented abuses by his forces, including targeted killings of civilians, as the army retook Gezira state in January 2025. The European Union sanctioned Keikel in July 2025 for these abuses. There is no publicly available information indicating that Sudanese authorities have investigated Keikel or his forces’ abuses when they were under the RSF command or later fighting alongside the army. Human Rights Watch could not verify whether the army has officially granted amnesty to the two commanders who recently defected or to previous defectors, in line with al-Burhan’s earlier declarations. Under international law, the Sudanese authorities have an obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for atrocity crimes and other serious human rights violations. This duty cannot be undermined by any pardon, amnesty, or other domestic legal provisions that effectively bestow impunity on those responsible for such crimes under international law. Using an amnesty to deny accountability for serious crimes, such as extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, and torture, is incompatible with Sudan’s obligations under international law, and could amount to a violation of the right of victims to an effective remedy, including their right to access justice, Human Rights Watch said. “It is alarming to see RSF defectors roam freely in Khartoum since April this year fearing no consequences,” Adam Musa, the director of Darfur Victims Support Organization, told Human Rights Watch. Throughout the conflict, neither of the main warring parties has taken credible steps to investigate and prosecute members of their own forces for atrocities, including serious human rights violations. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Joint Fact-Finding Mission said in April that “[w]ithout holding the perpetrators to account, impunity—a central driver of this conflict—will continue to persist.” The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur from July 2002 onward, following a referral by the UN Security Council in 2005. In January 2026, ICC Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan said in a briefing to the Security Council that “the Office of the Prosecutor is working intensively, collecting evidence, accelerating its investigations, together with affected communities, both with respect to crimes committed in Al Geneina in West Darfur, and in El Fasher in North Darfur.” But the ICC’s mandate remains limited to Darfur by the terms of the Security Council referral, even as serious abuses are being committed across Sudan. Members of the Coalition for Atrocity Prevention and Justice on Sudan, formed by the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway in February 2026, should prioritize efforts at the Security Council calling for expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction to the whole of Sudan, Human Rights Watch said. The coalition members should also publicly condemn any amnesty or similar measures that effectively grant impunity for those responsible of serious crimes, support documentation efforts, and push to prioritize justice and accountability in any possible talks to end the conflict in Sudan. “If anything is to be learned about addressing the ongoing atrocities in Sudan, it is that pushing justice down the ladder will only lead to more violence and atrocities,” Osman said. “The Sudanese authorities should investigate, as appropriate, prosecute defecting commanders for serious crimes, and cooperate with ongoing independent regional and international investigations, including allowing access to evidence, victims, and survivors.”

Click to expand Image Police officers stand outside a courthouse on January 21, 2025, in Baku, Azerbaijan. © 2025 Aziz Karimov/Getty Images (Berlin, June 10, 2026) – Azerbaijani authorities are prosecuting critics in exile, often based on social media posts and online commentary, Human Rights Watch said today. Those targeted, often convicted in absentia with long sentences, are at risk of extradition, detention during travel, and other forms of cross-border pressure. “These trials of government critics abroad lack all credibility and due process, and are simply intended to silence them,” said Giorgi Gogia, deputy Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Azerbaijani authorities appear to manufacture criminal cases from online speech so they can use them to pursue critics far beyond its borders.” Human Rights Watch reviewed eight verdicts issued by the Baku Courts for Serious Crimes between July 2025 and March 2026 in trials held in absentia. The courts convicted and sentenced Azerbaijanis living in Europe and the United States to between 6 and 16 years in prison in proceedings that relied heavily on the opinions of government-appointed forensic experts and involved state-appointed lawyers who had no contact with the absent defendants. The cases reflect a broader shift in Azerbaijan’s efforts to silence dissent beyond its borders. Amendments to the Criminal Procedures Code adopted in December 2023 introduced in absentia criminal proceedings for the first time. The new framework has enabled courts to turn online speech into criminal convictions that can later serve as the basis for extradition requests, detention during international travel, or asset seizures. Azerbaijani law formally allows a person convicted in absentia to request a new trial if they return to the country or are extradited. However, this offers little practical protection to exiled critics, who would face immediate detention and the prospect of challenging their convictions before the same judicial system that convicted them on dubious evidence in their absence. For more than a decade, Azerbaijan has systematically imprisoned independent journalists, civil society activists, and political opposition figures. As space for dissent inside the country shrank, many critics who avoided imprisonment continued their work from exile. Azerbaijani authorities increasingly sought to reach them through extradition requests, pressure on foreign governments, harassment of family members, and other forms of transnational repression. Human Rights Watch reviewed in absentia convictions involving individuals living in France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While the facts varied, they shared strikingly similar hallmarks. Prosecutors relied heavily on often years-old social media posts, YouTube broadcasts, and other online commentary. Courts accepted conclusions by government-appointed forensic experts purporting to determine whether the content was criminal; and state-appointed lawyers provided little or no meaningful defense. One of the clearest examples is the case of Altay Goyushov, a historian and academic living in France. On February 18, the Baku Court for Serious Crimes convicted him under article 281.2 of the Criminal Code of publicly calling for the violent seizure of power and sentenced him to six years in prison. The prosecution’s evidence consisted of a YouTube livestream broadcast in 2020, and two Facebook posts published in 2024 and 2025, discussing popular uprisings in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, with political commentary and historical comparisons, and criticizing the Azerbaijani government. A court-appointed forensic expert concluded that the statements constituted calls for the violent seizure of power, a finding the court accepted. The same day, the court also sentenced a political analyst Arastun Oruclu, who lives in New York, to eight years in prison on similar charges. Prosecutors cited YouTube videos in which Oruclu said that citizens should continue their struggle for accountability and that the government should either respond to public demands or leave office. Authorities characterized those statements as calls for the violent seizure of power and mass disorder, which the court also accepted. The largest case involved seven defendants living in Germany, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. On December 25, 2025, the Baku Court for Serious Crimes convicted all seven of calling for mass disorder and the violent seizure of power. Two were also convicted on fraud and terrorism-related charges. Prison terms ranged from 9 to 14 years. Prosecutors alleged that the defendants had coordinated the production and dissemination of content that constituted incitement through YouTube channels and other social media platforms. Again, the court relied on expert opinions characterizing content involving dozens of digital recordings and channels. Every speech-related case reviewed share a common thread: the Ministry of Justice’s Forensic Expertise Center for linguistic analysis issued findings that the online content contained calls for violent seizure of power, mass disorder, or terrorism. Yet the criteria used appear to have excluded what is required under international law to determine whether speech amounts to incitement. An expert opinion that fails to take into consideration international standards on protection of freedom of expression is inherently flawed. “The expert opinion is often the central piece of evidence in these cases,” one lawyer familiar with the proceedings told Human Rights Watch. “Because the defendant is absent, there is no meaningful opportunity to challenge the expert’s conclusions.” In absentia trials always raise serious fair trial concerns, which is why, under international law, verdicts given in absentia must be subject to a retrial. None of the verdicts recorded meaningful challenges to prosecution evidence or substantive defense arguments by the state-appointed lawyers or defense witnesses. Several hearings took place behind closed doors. Although the verdicts are formally available through Azerbaijan’s electronic court system, identifying information is routinely anonymized, limiting public scrutiny of the proceedings. Azerbaijan’s use of a deeply flawed form of evidence in proceedings marked by fundamental procedural shortcomings shows how far the authorities are willing to go to engage in transnational repression, Human Rights Watch said. International human rights law protects political speech, including speech that is critical, controversial, or offensive. While governments may prohibit speech that constitutes incitement to violence, the threshold is high and requires careful consideration of intent, context, and imminence. Governments may not equate criticism of state institutions or calls for political change with threats to national security. Restrictions on freedom of expression must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate. The reviewed cases indicate that Azerbaijani authorities are using overly broad criminal provisions to punish dissenting views rather than addressing genuine threats of violence. The convictions also have implications far beyond Azerbaijan. As a party to the European Convention on Extradition, Azerbaijan can invoke these convictions when seeking the return of individuals living abroad. Foreign courts may reject such requests, particularly over concerns about political prosecution, unfair trial, torture, or ill-treatment, but targeted individuals may still face detention, costly legal proceedings, travel restrictions, and prolonged uncertainty. The convictions may also increase risks for Azerbaijani critics traveling through third countries that have extradition arrangements with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan should immediately review all in absentia convictions involving speech-related offenses and quash convictions based on protected expression. They should also amend criminal code articles related to expression and ensure compliance with international standards and fair trial rights. European governments should carefully scrutinize any extradition request based on such convictions and ensure that asylum and protection procedures take into account the risk of politically motivated prosecution upon return. “Azerbaijan’s message is that leaving the country will not shield critics from retaliation,” Gogia said. “European governments should ensure that these convictions do not become tools of transnational repression.”