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That’s my perspective but I do like listening and reading others.
Best way took look at 1942, 1943, and 1944 in my opinion is to see it as a dam holding back a flood. 1942 cracks emerge that need to be dealt with. By 1943 the Axis is doing so many patch jobs they can’t fix any of the cracks permanently and more cracks keep forming. 1944 the dam breaks.
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57m
The problem with Market Garden was less the execution of the plan and more of the concept that a single drive could end the war in 1944. Metz and Hurtgen Forest occur during this period but those stalemates don’t make for good films.
Had it even been a success the Allies would’ve still had to pause due to logistical constraints.
Market-Garden is a part of a pattern. Trust me, a lot of Allied generals looked bad in late 1944 because they had reached the end of their operational momentum which happens in war. So why the fascination with Market-Garden? It’s the only real attempt at a decisive blow in late 44 and came “close.”