Associate Professor in Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University
Stockholm Center on Global Governance
ARENA, University of Oslo, ENROL โ Enforcing the rule of law: What can the European Union do to prevent rule of law deterioration from within?
Antoinette Scherz
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Much will depend on how entrenched actors, e.g. captured courts, respond.
Tiszaโs supermajority allows dismantling of many of these enclaves through legislation, so it would fail the necessity requirement restorative disobedience within the proportionality criterion.
In Poland, dismantling autocratic enclaves may require transgressive acts, even rule-breaking, which we call โrestorative disobedience.โ But this must meet demanding normative criteria: institutional hand-tying, public justification, & proportionality. How might Hungary differ?
This shifts the normative problem of frontsliding: what should constrain a dominant government in a hollowed system, where checks and balances have been eroded by prior backsliding?
Institutional hand-tying may become even more important.
๐ญ๐บ๐THREAD 1/3
The dismantling of state capture is already beginning today
In his victory speech, Pรฉter Magyar called for the resignation of
โ Tamรกs Sulyok, President of Hungary
โ the President of the Constitutional Court
โ the President of Hungaryโs Supreme Court (the Curia)
โ the Prosecutor General
Suspending funds is the EUโs strongest tool to safeguard rule of law. In Hungary, release of frozen EU funds was a key factor in Pรฉter Magyarโs campaign.
The Commission wants to enshrine RoL conditionality in the next MFF. In a new paper, I take a closer look: www.delorscentre.eu/en/publicati...
๐๐ผ๐ ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐จ ๐บ๐ฒ๐บ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ด๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐บ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐บ๐ผ๐ฐ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ ๐ฎ๐ณ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ธ๐๐น๐ถ๐ฑ๐ถ๐ป๐ด? Yesterday's #election in #Hungary forces us to grapple w/ the politics of "๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ค๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ค ๐ง๐ณ๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ต๐ด๐ญ๐ช๐ฅ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ." In @jeppjournal.bsky.social, @chrishillion.bsky.social, @ascherz.bsky.social & I have an argument- and warning- from Poland ๐thread
Magyar has called on the national president to resign so that the new parliament can elected a new president. (Orban amended the law on the presidency in December to make it impossible for the parliament to impeach the president.) If Sulyok stays, he can act as roadblock for the new govt.