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Andersen, Bromberg, and Pendl on Emojis in Contract Interpretation Camilla Baasch Andersen (University of Western Australia Law School), Marilyn Bromberg, and Matthias Pendl (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), …...

Greenleaf and Lindsay on Copyright’s Public Domains and AI Graham Greenleaf (Macquarie University - Macquarie Law School) and David F. Lindsay (UTS: Law) have posted…...

Kerr on a Societal Reliance Theory of Criminal Duress Andrew Jensen Kerr (South Texas College of Law Houston), A Societal Reliance Theory of Criminal Duress…...

Oman on Virtuous Debt and Sovereign Borrowing Nathan B. Oman (William & Mary Law School), Virtuous Debt: Sovereign Borrowing and Unjust Enrichment, North Carolina Journal of International Law (forthcoming) on SSRN....

Uuk et al. on the Empirical Evidence for AI Loss of Control Risto Uuk (Future of Life Institute; KU Leuven), Santeri Koivula (Future of Life Institute), Lorenzo Pacchiardi (Cambridge), Rokas Gipiskis (Future of Life Institute), Laura Caroli & Kamaria Horton (RAND Corporation) have posted…...

Hull on Algorithmic Governance and Agonism Gordon Hull (University of North Carolina at Charlotte), Erasing Agonism: How Algorithmic Governance Goes Further than Leviathan…...

Fagan on AI Personhood and the Allocation of Responsibility Frank Fagan (South Texas College of Law Houston), Stakeholder Personhood and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford Intersections: AI and Society (forthcoming) on SSRN....

Schwarcz and Stewart on a Unified Theory of Business Law Steven L. Schwarcz (Duke University School of Law) and Isabelle Stewart (Duke University School of Law) have posted…...

Ayotte and Ellias on Private Equity and Chapter 11 Agency Costs Kenneth Ayotte (University of California, Berkeley - School of Law) and Jared A. Ellias (Harvard Law School) have posted…...

Camilla Baasch Andersen (University of Western Australia Law School), Marilyn Bromberg, and Matthias Pendl (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), A Thumbs Up for Emojis in Contracting and Legal Communication, Transatlantic Law Journal (forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Digital communication poses new challenges for the law, with emojis emerging as a particularly striking example. Not only have emojis become a widespread mode of expression, but they have also increasingly been considered by courts worldwide.

Graham Greenleaf (Macquarie University - Macquarie Law School) and David F. Lindsay (UTS: Law) have posted Copyright’s Public Domains: The Limits on AI Appropriation on SSRN. Here is the abstract: The spectacular rise to commercial and intellectual prominence of artificial intelligence (AI) since 2022, and in particular the predominant role of generative AI and its use of large language models (LLMs), has given rise to many legal and policy problems.

Nathan B. Oman (William & Mary Law School), Virtuous Debt: Sovereign Borrowing and Unjust Enrichment, North Carolina Journal of International Law (forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: In debates over sovereign debt, sometimes debtors argue debts should be forgiven because the debtors were very bad, and they sometimes argue that debts should be forgiven because the debtors were very good.

Andrew Jensen Kerr (South Texas College of Law Houston), A Societal Reliance Theory of Criminal Duress, 19 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 306 (2026) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Criminal duress is puzzling in that fundamental values related to reliance and fair warning are inapposite to excuses like duress. We guard against fraud and strategic behavior, and for this reason, we insert the moral hazard condition that denies the availability of duress to those who consciously place themselves in criminogenic situations, such as by joining a gang.

Kenneth Ayotte (University of California, Berkeley - School of Law) and Jared A. Ellias (Harvard Law School) have posted Bankruptcy Team Sports and the Private Equity Playbook on SSRN. Here is the abstract: This chapter explains how the growth of private equity has reshaped the agency-cost problem at the center of Chapter 11. Historically, bankruptcy law policed collusive transactions between managers and favored outsiders through three principal tools: creditor “teams,” which force creditors with similar claims to act collectively and share costs and payoffs; market tests; and judicial valuation.

Steven L. Schwarcz (Duke University School of Law) and Isabelle Stewart (Duke University School of Law) have posted Towards a Unified Theory of Business Law on SSRN. Here is the abstract: This Article attempts to identify and unify the principles guiding business law—that is, the law regulating commerce, finance, bankruptcy, securities, and business organizations. Each such field of business is currently governed by its own corresponding field of law.

Risto Uuk (Future of Life Institute; KU Leuven), Santeri Koivula (Future of Life Institute), Lorenzo Pacchiardi (Cambridge), Rokas Gipiskis (Future of Life Institute), Laura Caroli & Kamaria Horton (RAND Corporation) have posted Assessing the Empirical Evidence for Loss of Control from Agentic General-Purpose AI on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Theoretical literature warns that advanced generalist agentic systems might pursue instrumental goals that are misaligned with human preferences, thus posing risks of irreversible loss of human control.

Frank Fagan (South Texas College of Law Houston), Stakeholder Personhood and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford Intersections: AI and Society (forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Legal personhood has long functioned as a tool for settling high-stakes conflicts in corporate organization, immigration, environmental protection, and political representation, and its allocation has consistently reflected the power and preferences of affected stakeholders. This article brings that institutional dynamic to debates over artificial intelligence by treating AI personhood not as a declaration of intrinsic status, but as a governance choice that reallocates responsibility.

Gordon Hull (University of North Carolina at Charlotte), Erasing Agonism: How Algorithmic Governance Goes Further than Leviathan, Philosophy & Social Criticism (2026) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Algorithmic governance is sometimes compared to Hobbes’s Leviathan. Here I argue that, while algorithmic governance shares some similarities with the Hobbesian schema, it goes further in its suppression of contestation. To show this, I read Hobbes against Rancière’s reduction of him to a theorist of consensus to make two basic points.